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Racial Discrimination in Public Housing:
Rights and Remedies
The Housing and Urban Development Act of 19681 explicitly reaf-
firmed the policy enunciated by Congress in 1949 of providing a decent
home for every American family.2 The achievement of that quantitative
goal, however, is limited by prohibitions against perpetuating or in-
creasing racial discrimination in housing. In recent years courts have
carefully scrutinized low income public housing programs to determine
whether their administration violates HUD's regulations, 3 the Civil
Rights Acts,4 or the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution.5
Since participation in public housing is an essentially voluntary under-
1 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 § 1601, 42 U.S.C. § 1441a (1970).
2 Housing Act of 1949 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970). Congress first authorized a federal
public housing program in the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401
et seq. (1970), which established the United States Housing Authority (USHA) within the
Department of Interior. The USHA was transferred to the Federal Works Agency in 1939,
then was joined with the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) under a National Hous-
ing Agency in 1942, with the public housing programs being administered under a new
semi-autonomous subagency called the Public Housing Agency (PHA). In 1949 the Housing
and Home Finance Agency became the new overseer of federal housing programs, and it
was brought into the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) upon
HUD's formation in 1965. See Ledbetter, Public Housing-A Social Experiment Seeks
Acceptance, 32 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 490, 493 (1967).
3 See, e.g., Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
4 Cf. Blackshear Residents Organization v. Housing Authority, 347 F. Supp. 1138 (W.D.
Tex. 1972). Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970), prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in the administration of fed-
erally assisted programs. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619
(1970), deals primarily with private discrimination in housing, but also requires the
Secretary of HUD to administer all programs "in a manner affirmatively to further" fair
housing policies. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d)(5) (1970). Prior to the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, a 1962 Executive Order on Equal Opportunity in Housing, Exec. Order No. 11063,
3 C.F.R. 652 (Comp. 1959-63), directed federal agencies to "take all action necessary and
appropriate" to prevent racial discrimination in federally assisted housing programs where
the assistance contract was entered into after the date of the Order. The Public Housing
Authority did not take an expansive interpretation of its vague powers under the Order.
See Note, The Public Housing Administration and Discrimination in Federally Assisted
Low-Rent Housing, 64 MICH. L. REv. 871, 879 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Discrimination
in Low-Rent Housing].
5 See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment applies only to the states, but
the Supreme Court has made it dear that the same restrictions apply to federal action
through the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954).
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taking by local authorities,0 federally imposed restrictions that do not
coincide with the self-perceived interests of the localities tend to defeat
the national housing policy by causing localities to refuse to conduct
or cooperate in housing programs. Nevertheless, where a housing
project is found to have been constructed or maintained in a manner
inconsistent with the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution,
the constitutional violation must be remedied. At least one court has
held that such a violation can be cured only by restricting the control
of local authorities over the selection of sites for new projects and has
ordered the construction of new projects in specified areas of the city.7
It appears clear, however, that localities do not have sufficient funds of
their own to engage in the construction of public housing 8 Court-
ordered construction, to remedy even constitutional defects, is there-
fore dependent on the existence of federal funding.
As a result of dissatisfaction with the overall shortcomings of the
current program there is a likelihood that Congress will enact legisla-
tion providing for direct cash assistance to low-income tenants and will
eventually terminate federal financing of construction of public hous-
ing.9 If such an alternative program is adopted, the courts will have to
face the problem of fashioning appropriate remedial orders within the
framework of the new program to cure constitutional violations that
arose under the prior statutory scheme.
This comment discusses the evidentiary showing required to hold a
local housing authority or HUD guilty of violating the equal protection
clause in its administration of the public housing system as it currently
exists. The comment then suggests ways in which these violations can
6 A qualified Local Housing Authority must make application for federal assistance,
show a need for low-rent housing that is not being fulfilled by private enterprise, and
enter into a Cooperation Agreement with the governing body of the locality before
HUD may finance the building of low-rent public housing. 24 C.F.R. § 275.3 (1973).
7 Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (judgment
order).
8 See Ledbetter, supra note 2, at 521; Roisman, The Right to Public Housing, 39 Gao.
VAsir. L. Rav. 691, 692 (1971).
9 President Nixon has stated that public housing has failed to provide adequate or
decent housing, and has indicated that on the basis of HUD's major housing study of 1973,
direct cash assistance is the most probable alternative program which the federal govern-
ment will undertake. 119 CONG. Rim. S 16861, S 16864 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1973) (President
Nixon's message to Congress). The Senate held hearings on the Administration bill, S. 2507,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), which would establish a cash assistance pilot program, but on
March 11, 1974, passed an alternative bill which would reestablish the public housing
program and allow an extension and expansion of the experimental housing allowance
program, S. 3066, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., ch. II, § 201, and ch. VIII, § 802 (1974). See notes
95-96 infra.
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be remedied under a federal program of direct cash assistance to low-
income tenants.
I. ELEMENTS OF A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION
IN PUBLIC HOUSING
Challenges to the administration of public housing systems as deny-
ing equal protection to tenants have focused on segregative practices in
site selection 0 and tenant assignment." When a plaintiff demonstrates
that the local housing authority has deliberately sought to place projects
that will be occupied by racial minorities in minority areas, or has
intentionally assigned Blacks to certain projects and Whites to others,
discrimination in violation of the Constitution has been shown.' 2
The state can offer no countervailing interest sufficient to justify the
intentional discrimination.'3 The public housing cases, therefore, have
dealt primarily with whether the actions of the state are sufficient to
permit a finding of intentional discrimination. Definition of a sufficient
10 See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907, 909-14 (N.D.
Il. 1969); Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619, 621-24 (E.D. La. 1969). The Local Housing
Authority has initial responsibility for selecting sites for public housing construction, HUD
HANDBOOK 7410.1, LOW-RENT PUBLiC HOUSING PaxCONSTRUCMoN, para. 1-6(a) (1974), and
until the promulgation of strict selection criteria by HUD, it could effectively control the
ultimate selection by narrowing the alternatives that were presented to HUD for final
approval. See notes 54 & 60 infra.
11 See, e.g., Taylor v. City of Millington, 476 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1973); Gautreaux v.
Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907, 909 (N.D. Ill. 1969). Tenant assignment
procedures of local housing authorities have similarly come under stricter control by HUD.
See notes 54, 55 & 65 infra.
12 The guarantee against denial of the "equal protection-of the laws" by state admin-
istrative or legislative action is a guarantee against differential treatment on the basis of
unreasonable or arbitrary classification. Equal protection doctrine has developed into essen-
tially a two-tier standard of review, with minimal scrutiny of state actions except where a
"suspect class" of plaintiffs or a "fundamental interest" is affected, in which case the re-
quired showing of a "compelling" state interest is a virtually insurmountable bar to justi.
fication. See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065(1969). The pre-eminence of the two-tier standard is currently in question, as alternative
formulations aimed at a less conclusory operation of judicial review are suggested. See, e.g.,
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458 (1973) (White, J., concurring); San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70-133 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Gunther,
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAav. L. RXv. 1 (1972). Under all the
alternative formulations, however, a classification scheme based on race is subject to the
strictest scrutiny and can be justified only by a very important countervailing state
interest.
13 Only one case, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), has found a state
interest sufficient to justify state discrimination on the basis of race; the overriding state
interest in that case was national security in time of war. See Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp.
382, 392 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp.
669, 695-96 (W.D.N.Y. 1970).
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evidentiary showing is essential to understanding the nature of what
may properly be called unconstitutional discrimination and to shaping
effective and responsive remedies.
A. The Prima Facie Violation of Equal Protection by the Local
Housing Authority:' 4 Creation and Rebuttal
1. The Plaintiff's Burden. Every legislative or administrative action
has three basic components-the explicit operative rule, the objectives
or purposes underlying the rule, and the effects of the rule. 5 A clear
case of intentional racial discrimination is made out when the plaintiff
can show that either the explicit operative rule16 or the legislative ob-jectives' 7 are constitutionally suspect or impermissible.' 8 Where, how-
ever, the plaintiff makes only a statistical showing of segregation-
of suspect effects without impermissible operative rules or objectives-
the plaintiff's burden will not be satisfied. 19 The requirement that
more than just segregative effects be shown to establish a prima facie
violation arises from the state action requirement of the fourteenth
amendment. If racially differential effects of the operation of a govern-
ment program appear to be the totally fortuitous result of an unfore-
seeable independent force, the discrimination is not attributable to
the state's action. Once knowledge of that force or of the probable
consequences of the administrative action can be attributed to govern-
mental officials, however, the showing goes beyond mere effect. It can
14 The local authority that administers the public housing system is a governmental
entity, 24 C.F.R. § 275.1(e) (1973), and may therefore be found to have violated the four-
teenth amendment by its actions.
15 See Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95.
16 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S.
60 (1917). Early cases holding explicit segregation of public housing unconstitutional were
Vann v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing Authority, 113 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ohio 1953);
Banks v. Housing Authority, 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 (1st Dist. 1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 974 (1954); Detroit Housing Comm'n v. Lewis, 226 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1955).
17 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
18 Impermissibility is created by explicit or unarticulated but inevitable disadvantaging
of the minority. Residential segregation arguably produces the same kinds of psychological
injury, deterioration of physical surroundings, and loss of associational benefits as are pro-
duced by segregated schools, making state-created residential segregation impermissible
per se. See generally C. ABRAMs, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 18-28, 70-80 (1955); D. MCENTIRE,
REs NCE AND RAcE 67-101 (1960); cf. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409
U.S. 205 (1972). But see, e.g., Piven & Cloward, The Case Against Urban Desegregation, 12
SOCIAL WORx 12, 18-21 (1967); S. CARMICHAEL & C. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER 54-56 (1967);
cf. Vieira, Racial Imbalance, Black Separatism, and Permissible Classification by Race, 67
MICH. L. Rav. 1553, 1618-25 (1969). Even if the school analogy is not adopted, explicit
separation of the races by the state is suspect and presumptively unconstitutional.
19 See Brest, supra note 15, at 110; cf. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549-50 (1972).
1974]
The University oJ Chicago Law Review
then be argued that a presumptive intention to achieve or maintain
the segregative result was operative in the decision to undertake the
general practice that produced that result.20
There are difficulties, however, in articulating the factors that must
be present, in addition to a showing of effect, to permit such a presump-
tion.21 The courts are wary of examining the subjective motivations
underlying a single administrative decision that produces suspect
results but is innocent on its face or explainable in terms of an innocent
purpose.22 In cases involving the administration of an entire public
housing system, however, a composite of factors may properly establish
the systematic application of racial criteria.
23
In Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority,24 the court inferred a
deliberate policy of perpetuation of residential segregation in Chicago
and within the public housing system. The inference of intentional
discrimination arose from a showing of three factors: first, a pre-19 54
policy of explicit segregation and a continuing policy of quota assign-
ment which kept certain projects substantially White;25 second, a find-
ing that more than 99 percent of the units occupied by Black tenants
were in projects located in Black neighborhoods; 26 and third, site selec-
tion procedures that resulted in the rejection by the Chicago City
Council and the Chicago Housing Authority of over 99 percent of the
sites proposed in White areas and only 10 percent of the sites proposed
in Black areas.27 The prior history of intentional discrimination plus
the improbability that segregation of this magnitude could result from
causes other than purposeful discrimination made it appropriate to put
20 See, e.g., Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 592 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Fiss, Racial
Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REv. 564,
584-85 (1965); cf. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931
(2d Cir. 1968); Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 335 F. Supp. 16, 23-25 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
21 In some of the jury exclusion cases, evidence of particular practices of the state of-
ficials responsible for selecting jurors was adduced to supplement the purely statistical evi-
dence on the effects of the selection process. See, e.g., Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545
(1967). Where statistical evidence alone was offered to prove discrimination, the Court
required that the data show effects of sufficient mathematical improbability to indicate
some covert systematic exclusion of minorities. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,
208-09 (1965); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); cf. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. at
552 n.2. The degree of mathematical improbability of the actual effects may determine the
probative strength of statistical evidence. See text and note at note 41 infra.
22 Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 383-84 (1968); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
23 See Brest, supra note 15, at 105.
24 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
25 Id. at 909.
26 Id. at 910.
27 Id. at 911-12.
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the burden on the defendant to show the absence of racial discrimina-
tion. The presumption of intentional discrimination could be rebutted
only by a showing that racial criteria were not used in selecting sites; 28
the Chicago Housing Authority was unable to make that showing. The
court held insufficient the justification that racial differentiation was
motivated by a desire to fill the housing need without exacerbating
local opposition in White areas. 29
In Hicks v. Weaver,30 decided several months later, another federal
district court applied the same principles in evaluating the public
housing program of Bogalusa, Louisiana. A presumptive violation of
the fourteenth amendment was established by three sets of evidence:
that the local authorities considered only sites in ghetto areas for a new
project intended to house displaced Blacks; a recently abandoned
official policy of segregative tenant assignment and site selection; and
the continued segregated occupancy of existing projects.3 1 It was sug-
gested by the court that the presumption could be rebutted by a
showing that no acceptable sites other than those in Black neighbor-
hoods were available, but as in Gautreaux, the defendant housing
authority could not make that showing.
In a more recent case, the public housing program of Cleveland,
Ohio, was held to have been administered in violation of the fourteenth
amendment and the Civil Rights Acts.32 The plaintiff showed that
most new public housing projects had been placed in minority areas
of the city, that city officials had rejected certain privately-developed,
subsidized low-income projects in White areas of the city, and that a
referral system of tenant assignment had been used that required
tenant applications to be processed through project managers who were
of the same race as the majority of tenants in the segregated projects
and in the segregated surrounding neighborhoods. The court found
that there had been no satisfactory showing of an alternative explana-
tion for the city's denial of building permits for the proposed White-
area projects.3 3 The court also held that good faith operation of the
housing system by the Cleveland Metropolitan Housing Authority was
28 Id. at 913.
20 Id. at 914.
30 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969).
31 Id. at 623. The Bogalusa Housing Authority's presumptively purposeful discrimina-
tion was held also to violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1970). HUD was held in violation of the same Act as an active participant through its
approval and funding of the segregated system. 302 F. Supp. at 623.
32 Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
33 Id. at 1179.
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no defense where the natural and probable effect of its actions was
known to be the perpetuation of residential segregation.34
By contrast, another federal district court found no prima facie
violation on a roughly similar set of facts.35 The court denied a motion
for a preliminary injunction against construction of a project in a
Black area of Miami, holding that the defendant had shown to the
court's satisfaction that the site selection was "motivated solely by
community needs."38
The holdings in these cases may provide some insight into factors
that, when combined with a showing of segregation within the public
housing system, will trigger a presumption of intentional racial discrim-
ination on the part of the local housing authority. The plaintiff may
produce evidence of the historical context, immediate objectives, and
both foreseeable and actual effects of the challenged public housing
practices in attempting to establish a presumption that the practices
involved the use of racial criteria.3Y
Although the holdings of two district courts do not conclusively
define the law,38 a comparison of the Miami with the Bogalusa case89
may be instructive as to the general limits of the required evidentiary
showing. The Bogalusa Housing Authority had maintained an official
policy of segregation until 1968, while the Miami Housing Authority
had abandoned its explicitly segregative policy in favor of an official
policy of nondiscrimination prior to the effective date of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The contested site in Miami was located in a
racially mixed area, rather than a completely Black area as in Bogalusa,
,and the degree of actual segregation within the Miami public housing
system was less than that in Bogalusa's. Finally, the Miami site was
chosen after consultation with and explicit approval by representatives
of the Black community, a process not followed in Bogalusa. The dif-
ference between the two cases seems to be one of degree, dependent on
the peculiar history and background of the selection of a challenged
site or of the administration of a locality's entire system. Generalized
quantification of the plaintiff's burden may thus be impossible.
The potential elements of a plaintiff's indirect proof of discrimina-
tion may, however, be assigned relative weights based on their relative
- 34 Id. at 1183.
35 Thompson v. Housing Authority, 251 F. Supp. 121 (S.D. Fla. 1966).
36 Id. at 124.
37 Cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373 (1967).
38 There is the additional complication that a possibly determinative factor in Thomp-
son was the plaintiff's failure to appear for testimony at the hearing. 251 F. Supp. at 123.
39 Thompson v. Housing Authority, 251 F. Supp. 121 (S.D. Fla. 1966), and Hicks v.
Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969), respectively.
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probative strength. Statistical evidence as to the results of the site selec-
tion and tenant assignment procedures is essential to the showing of a
racial classification. 40 In general, statistical evidence of segregative re-
sults serves merely as a threshold to an indirect showing of racial dis-
crimination, but segregative results may also be influential to the
extent that they compel the conclusion that only consistent application
of racial criteria could have produced them.41
The next most important element of proof involves facts surround-
ing the current administration of the housing program, which may
bear on the administrators' objectives. Such facts are necessarily pecu-
liar to each case, and may vary widely in probative strength. Examples
range from an admission that the authority used factors that correlate
highly with race, to the existence of an informal system of aldermanic
veto of sites in a racially segregated city,42 to the existence of waiting
lists for housing that are composed almost entirely of minorities.43
40 As of 1963, 77.7 percent of all PHA projects were completely segregated in occupancy.
PUBLIC HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, TRENDs TowARD OPEN OCCUPANCY, Report No. 12, at
Table 1 (1963). Current data for racial occupancy by project is reported semi-annually to
HUD by all local housing authorities, but no compilation is made. Telephone Interview
with Jeffrey Frant, Equal Opportunity Specialist, HUD, Washington, D.C., January 9, 1974.
It seems likely that actual segregation in some degree is the normal situation in most lo-
calities, due to the historical existence of officially segregative policies, the existence of
private discrimination in the housing market, and the relatively recent appearance of
HUD project selection and tenant assignment guidelines of more than advisory weight.
Further, the steadily increasing identification of public housing as Black housing because
of the relative unavailability to Blacks of private units has created situations in which non-
minority site location is resisted by local residents, and placement of racially nondesignated
public housing on minority sites produces Black housing in Black neighborhoods. See
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969); D. McENTIRE,
supra note 18, at 324-25; Friedman, Government and Slum Housing: Some General Con-
siderations, 32 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 357, 362 (1967).
41 See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. 111. 1969).
"It is incredible that this dismal prospect of an all Negro public housing system in all
Negro areas came about without the persistent application of a deliberate policy to con-
fine public housing to all Negro or immediately adjacent changing areas." Id. at 910. The
statistics in that case showed "a very high probability, a near certainty, that many sites
were vetoed on the basis of the racial composition of the site's neighborhood." Id. at 913.
42 Id. at 909-12. A similar allegation of City Council rejection of White sites has been
made in a suit brought in Memphis, Tennessee. Hale v. HUD, Civil No. 73-410 (W.D.
Tenn., filed Sept. 20, 1973).
43 Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907, 909 (N.D. Ill. 1969);
Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619, 621 (E.D. La. 1969). Other examples of seemingly neutral
actions in relation to subsidized housing other than public housing that courts have held
in context to constitute illegal discrimination are the denial of building permits to non-
minority-site low-income housing projects, Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382, 389 (N.D. Ga.
1971); the rezoning of a proposed nonminority site to open space use, declaration of a
moratorium on subdivision building, and denial of a sewer extension application, Kennedy
Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 113-14 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 US. 1010 (1971); and the denial of rezoning and building permit applications for a
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Third in weight among the evidentiary elements that the plaintiff
may use is proof of a history of discrimination. Again, the probative
strength of such evidence may vary rather widely. Virtually every local
housing authority has at one time pursued an explicit policy of racial
segregation,44 but the relevance of that historical policy to the existence
of a currently covert one depends greatly on the policy's original scope
and ultimate duration.45 Evidence of historical context is neither con-
ceptually necessary, as with statistical proof of differentiation, nor
potentially determinative.46
2. Rebutting the Prima Facie Case. After the plaintiff has established
a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, the defendant has the
burden of proving that he did not use racial factors in making his
decision.47 Mere assertion of the absence of such use or of good faith
consideration of valid alternative factors is insufficient,48 although satis-
single project, Dailey v. City of Lawton, 296 F. Supp. 266, 268 (W.D. Okla. 1969), aff'd,
425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970). See generally Sisters of Providence of St. Mary of the
Woods v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396, 403-05 (N.D. Il. 1971), collecting cases within
categories of typical fact patterns.
44 Information as to the number of local housing authorities that have had explicit
policies of racial segregation or racial differentiation in site selection or tenant assignment
is not available from HUD. Letter from Julian B. McKay, Acting Director, Office of
Housing Programs, HUD, to The University of Chicago Law Review, December 10, 1973.
One study indicates, however, that most localities originally chose to pursue such policies.
D. McENaTnE, supra note 18, at 319-21. As of March 31, 1953, seven Northern states, the
District of Columbia, and some localities in two other states had explicit open occupancy
policies, while fifteen of the remaining thirty-nine states had no policy but did have some
integrated projects. PUBLIC HOUSING ADMINIsTRATION, OPEN OCCUPANCY IN HOUsING PRO.
GRAms, Report No. 2 (1953). By 1963, thirty-three states and the District of Columbia
(comprising 452 localities) had open occupancy policies, fifteen of the thirty-three pro-
hibited discrimination in public housing by law, and the remaining twelve states in the
public housing program (comprising 831 localities) still had no policy. PUBLIC HOUSING
ADMINISTRA-ION, TRENDS TowARD OPEN OCCUPANCY, Report No. 12, at i, vii (1963).
45 Compare Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969), with Thompson v.
Housing Authority, 251 F. Supp. 121 (SD. Fla. 1966).
46 An explicit policy of discriminatory site selection in the past has relevance to the
responsibility of current defendants who continue to administer the segregated housing
that the policy produced when the remedy sought is directed primarily at curing the
racially disproportionate availability of units which has resulted. The causal link between
present segregation and a historical discriminatory tenant assignment policy is more
difficult to establish, but where the policy was so recent that its administrators are the
current administrators of a program that has remained segregated, historical evidence is
clearly relevant to the question of whether those administrators should be held liable to
cure the effects of prior discrimination.
47 Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907, 913 (N.D. m. 1969); cf.
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 210-12 (1973).
48 Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1039 (10th Cir. 1970); Banks v. Perk, 341
F. Supp. 1175, 1183 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F.
Supp. 907, 914 (N.D. Ill. 1969); cf. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 474 F.2d 81,
84-85 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 413 U.. 920 (1973).
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factory proof of the negative proposition is obviously quite difficult. It
has been suggested that the absence of racial criteria might be proved
by showing that no sites in White areas were available,49 but the stan-
dard of availability in this instance must be rigorous.50 Some allegedly
nonracial criteria are so highly correlated with race that courts have
held, as a matter of law, that their use constitutes racial discrimination.
An example of such a criterion is concern for avoiding local opposition
to low-income housing5' or school integration 52 in nonminority areas.
The nonracial criteria must also not be such as will interact with private
patterns of discrimination to produce readily foreseeable segregative
effects. The legal maxim that one is presumed to have intended the
foreseeable consequences of his acts is operative in this area.5 Thus,
where it is foreseeable that state action will result in segregation,
it is appropriate that the authorities be held to have intended the
segregation.
In order for the defendant local housing authority to overcome a
presumption of intentional discrimination arising from a demonstra-
tion of segregative effects, a history of discrimination, and other factors
indirectly bearing on intent, it must prove that the only criteria it
actually considered in making its site selections and tenant assignments
were neither highly correlated with race nor produced readily foresee-
able segregative results.
B. The Prima Facie Violation of Equal Protection by HUD
The Department of Housing and Urban Development has been held
liable for the segregative administration of public housing, in the
provision of which it is an indispensable participant. HUD's prede-
cessors, like many of the local housing authorities, explicitly fostered
racial discrimination in the early development of the public housing
49 Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619, 623 (E.D. La. 1969).
50 Cf. 5 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-Cv. LiB. L. Rav. 150, 155 (1970). Where systematic applica-
tion of a racial criterion has been shown, unavailability less than virtual nonexistence,
for example due to relative cost, is merely an alternative explanation of the action, and
is not sufficient to prove that the racial criterion was not considered. The court will not
make a subjective inquiry to determine which consideration actually predominated in
the minds of the administrators. Where, however, a single subsidized project is pre-
vented from being built in a nonminority area, a prima facie showing of the use of any
systematic racial criterion that operates to reject White sites and allow Black sites may be
impossible. See Sisters of Providence of St. Mary of the Woods v. City of Evanston, 335 F.
Supp. 396, 404 (N.D. Inl. 1971). In such situations, the difficult task of assessing conflicting
"motives" or "purposes" of the state officials arises. See Brest, supra note 15, at 112-18.
51 Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907, 914 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
52 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 US. 1 (1958).
53 See authorities cited note 20 supra.
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and private mortgage insurance programs." The policies have gradually
changed 5 in response to Executive Order 1106356 and the Civil Rights
Acts of 1964 57 and 1968,58 and HUD was finally compelled by the
decision in Shannon v. HUD59 to promulgate comprehensive Project
Selection Criteria60 and tenant selection procedures.6 1 These changes
in policy, however, do not absolve HUD from liability for its past
discrimination. HUD has been found in violation of the equal protec-
tion clause 62 through its active segregative policy and through its
knowing acquiescence in the discriminatory practices of local housing
authorities.63 HUD participates in the planning and has final responsi-
54 The FHA was most explicit in its administration of the mortgage insurance program,
officially encouraging racially restrictive covenants by property owners and the "red-lining"
of potentially transitional neighborhoods by its appraisers from 1938 until 1947. See
C. ABRAMS, supra note 18, at 229-37; D. McENnaPE, supra note 18, at 301; U.S. CoMM'N ON
CIvIL RIGHTS, REPORT, BOOK 4: HoUsING 16 (1961). Public housing provided from the in-
ception of the program through World War H was, for the most part, segregated. Id. at
17, 23; D. McENrmE, supra note 18, at 318. Racial policies were left to the local agencies,
whose authority to maintain segregated sites was upheld on the basis of the separate but
equal doctrine. See, e.g., Favors v. Randall, 40 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1941); Housing Au-
thority v. Higginbotham, 143 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). The PHA's official policy
after 1949 became a requirement of "equitable provision [of public housing] for eligible
families of all races," even if segregated. PuBLIc HOUSING ADMINisTRATION, Low-R.ENT
HOUSING MANUAL § 102.1 (1951); see Heyward v. Public Housing Administration, 238 F.2d
689, 697 (5th Cir. 1956) (fifth amendment claim lay against PHA for failing to supply
housing on the basis of need, because its "equitable provision" policy allowed an explicit
policy of racial segregation by the local housing authority, citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954)); U.S. Coand'N ON CimVu RIGHTS, supra, at 143. See generally Note, Discrim-
ination in Low-Rent Housing, supra note 4.
55 Compare PuBLic HOusING ADMINISTRATION, Low-RENT HOUSING MANUAL § 102.1 (1963),
with Ptmuac HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, Low-RENT HOUSING MANUAL § 102.1 (1965); see note
40 supra.
56 3 C.F.R. 652 (Comp. 1959-63); see note 4 supra.
57 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970); see note 4 supra.
58 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1970); see note 4 supra.
59 436 F.2d 809 (3rd Cir. 1970). Shannon established a statutory duty on HUD's part to
consider the racial effect of the placement of a single rent supplement project (higher in-
come than public housing) in a minority area.
60 24 C.F.R. § 200.710 (1973). These criteria, effective since 1972, provide for the auto-
matic rejection of most projects proposed to be built in minority areas. See generally Max-
well, HUD's Project Selection Criteria-A Cure for "Impermissible Color Blindness"2, 48
NOTRo DAME LAW. 92 (1972).
61 See 24 C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(2)(ii)(1973).
62 The Seventh Circuit in Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 1971), held
HUD to the same standard under the fifth amendment as applies to states under the
fourteenth, relying on Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
63 This acquiescence has taken the form of approval of expedient but nonqualifying
sites. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 737-40 (7th Cir. 1971), 363 F. Supp. 690 (N.D.
III. 1973) (judgment order); cf. Blackshear Residents Organization v. Housing Authority,
347 F. Supp. 1138, 1146-48 (W.D. Tex. 1972). But see Croskey Street Concerned Citizens v.
Romney, 459 F.2d 109 (3rd Cir. 1972), affirming the denial of an injunction against con-
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bility for approving the selection of sites64 and the tenant assignment
procedures.65 It is therefore clearly a partner in any racially discrimi-
natory practices arising at the time of construction of a low-income
housing project. Nor does HUD's participation end with the construc-
tion of the project, for it may contribute maintenance costs66 and, by
virtue of the agreement between it and the local housing authority,
may require the local authority to continue to administer the program
under agreed-upon procedures and to change those procedures only
with HUD's approval. 67 A continuing violation on the part of local
authorities is, therefore, a continuing violation by HUD.
HUD was held liable along with the local housing authority in both
Gautreaux68 and Hicks.69 Evidence adduced by plaintiffs in each case
concerned the Department's continuous involvement in the public
housing process through funding and planning advice, and its approval
of the segregative sites with knowledge of the racial circumstances and
probable consequences.70 The Seventh Circuit in Gautreaux rejected
HUD's contentions that it was not liable because its actions were
performed in good faith or in accordance with the valid objective of
fulfilling an urgent need for housing that could not be provided unless
struction of a HUD-approved low-rent housing project in a 95 percent Black area, on
HUD's promise that a "balancing" White-area project would be built. The "balancing"
exception is reflected in the Project Selection Criteria whereby a minority-area project is
to be disfavored but not absolutely barred. 24 C.F.R. § 200.710, Criterion 2(B)(2) (1973).
See also Coffey v. Romney, P-H EQUAL Opp. IN HOUSING 13,588 (M.D.N.C. May 11, 1972),
rejecting a challenge to HUD's approval of a section 236 project (higher income than pub-
lic housing) in an originally predominantly White area that became racially mixed, because
the project was shown not to promote increasing racial concentration. See 24 C.F.R.
§ 200.710, Criterion 2(B)(1) (1973).
64 HUD HANDBOOK 7410.1, LoW-RENT PUBLIc HOUSING PRECONSrRUCTION, para. 1-6(c)
(1974). The Project Selection Criteria, supra note 60, provide the relevant standard. Id. at
para. 1-2(h).
65 24 C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(2)(ii) (1973). Acceptable plans must provide assignment from the
top of a community-wide list, with from zero to two refusals of available vacancies allowed
before the applicant is moved back to the bottom of the list. HUD HANDBOOK HM 7401.1,
LOW-RENT HOUSING: ADMINISTRATION OF PROGRAM, Ch. 9, § 1, App. 2, para. l(d) (1973).
"Freedom of choice" is used in this comment to refer to such plans. Cf. Gautreaux v.
Chicago Housing Authority, 304 F. Supp. 736, 742-43 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (judgment order).
C6 42 U.S.C. § 1410(a) (1970).
67 FORM HUD-53011, ANNUAL CONTRIBUTIONS CONTRACT PART Two, TERsS AND CON-
DITIONS §§ 201, 202 (1969). The government may take possession or title of the projects or
terminate the contract at its option in the event that the low-rent character of the projects
is not maintained or in case of other substantial default or breach. Id. at §§ 501, 508,
509; 42 U.S.C. § 1451(3) (1970).
68 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971).
69 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969).
70 Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 739 (7th Cir. 1971); Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp.
619, 623 (E.D. La. 1969).
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local racially-motivated opposition were avoided.71 Proof of HUD's
efforts toward desegregation was held to be insufficient to negate liabil-
ity for the intentional discrimination established through evidence of
approval of the segregative sites.72
Recognition of HUD's liability is important if courts are to be suc-
cessful in ordering effective remedies to cure the constitutional viola-
tion caused by intentional racial discrimination. Any remedy that goes
beyond a mere prohibition of future discrimination will require the
participation of HUD in the form of continued funding.
7 3
II. THE RiEMEDIAL STANDARD
A. The Content of the Equal Protection Guarantee in Public Housing
A precise statement of the constitutional violation involved in the
public housing cases is essential to an examination of the permissible
and the appropriate remedies. Although the equity powers of a court
in shaping relief for violations of the Constitution are broad, the relief
granted must, of course, be limited to the curing of the violation. 4
The Gautreaux judgment order 5 has been severely criticized on the
ground that it makes policy decisions beyond the competency of the
court and beyond what is required by the fourteenth amendment.7 6
The Gautreaux court, however, seems correct in defining the right of
the plaintiffs as a constitutional guarantee against state restriction of
minorities to minority neighborhoods and minority projects through
the conscious use of racial factors in shaping site selection and tenant
assignment policies.77
71 448 F.2d at 739. HUD's own Project Selection Criteria now allow approval of minority
sites on the basis of overriding need only if the need is caused by forces other than racial
opposition of local residents of nonminority areas. 24 C.F.R. § 200.710, Criterion 2(B)(3)
(1973).
72 Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 1971). But cf. Crow v. Brown, 332
F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971). The district court there rejected the significance of HUD's
role of approval, but dismissed the claim against HUD on the ground of its recent dis-
approval of segregative sites. The focus of the suit was the obstruction by county officials
of construction on two White sites that HUD had already approved, and the court was
unwilling to allow broader claims to attach liability to cooperative parties. 332 F. Supp.
at 395.
73 Cf. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 736-37 (7th Cir. 1971).
74 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1971).
75 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. i1. 1969).
76 See, e.g., Note, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1172, 1181 (1969); Note, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1386, 1393
(1969); Note, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 559, 568; Note, Public Housing and Urban Policy: Gau-
treaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 79 YALE L.J. 712, 710-19, 724-29 (1969).
77 "[P]laintiffs, as present and future users of the system, have the right under the
Fourteenth Amendment to have sites selected for public housing projects without regard
to the racial composition of either the surrounding neighborhood or of the projects them-
selves." 265 F. Supp. at 583.
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Some courts have responded to alternative claims under the Civil
Rights Acts,78 and have held that beyond the constitutional duty not
to use racial characteristics to the detriment of the rights of minorities
within a public housing system, there is a statutory duty to promote
integration, or take affirmative action to avoid segregation, by con-
sidering the racial impact of project placement in minority areas. 79 This
duty, however, is statutory only, and is not constitutionally required, 0
if indeed constitutionally permitted.81
Strict delineation of the constitutional and statutory requirements
has important ramifications for the remedies to be provided. Since a
violation of the equal protection clause is not found in segregated
occupancy alone, the remedial goal is not integrated occupancy per se.
The constitutional violation consists of state-imposed racial discrimina-
tion and the appropriate remedy requires providing each public hous-
ing applicant with a fair opportunity to be assigned, by choice or by
selection, to a public housing project that was selected, constructed,
and administered without regard to racial characteristics. The lack of
public housing projects in nonminority areas caused by discriminatory
site selection as well as the psychological and sociological impact of
state-imposed segregation, however, may require the temporary con-
sideration of racial characteristics in order to achieve the racially neu-
tral state necessary to ensure that minorities are not forced to take
housing in minority areas.
B. Remedial Requirements for Discriminatory Site Selection and
Tenant Assignment
Where an administrative mechanism has been used to obstruct the
construction of individual low-income projects in nonminority areas,
a simple injunction against the obstructing device is ordinarily a
sufficient remedy.s2 Where, instead of reactive attempts to maintain
78 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 US.C. § 2000d (1970); Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3608(d)(5) (1970); see text and notes at notes 4 & 57-58 supra.
79 See, e.g., Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3rd Cir. 1970); Blackshear Residents Orga-
nization v. Housing Authority, 347 F. Supp. 1138, 1146-48 (W.D. Tex. 1972); Crow v.
Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382, 390-91 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
80 Contra, Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175, 1182 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
81 The acceptable limits of an affirmative duty to integrate have yet to be drawn. See
Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'g and re-
manding 354 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); cf. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 94 S. Ct. 1704 (1974),
dismissing as moot 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973).
82 See, e.g., Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669, 697
(W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 US. 1010 (1971), where
defendant City was enjoined from condemning the site, from denying a sewer application,
and from using any other devices to obstruct the low-income housing project's construction.
Three years later, however, the court, having retained jurisdiction, was forced to order the
City Planning Board to approve the project's final subdivision development plan. Kennedy
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residential segregation in the face of efforts to dilute it, the discrimina-
tion shown is the furtherance of racial segregation by placement of
low-income housing projects expected to be inhabited by minority
tenants in minority neighborhoods, construction of the individual
projects may be enjoined. 3
In cases involving proof of more institutionalized or broader dis-
criminatory practices, however, the relief granted may require utiliza-
tion of broader remedies to undo the complex remains of a long-standing
system. These remedies will generally take the form of an injunction
conditioning the future expenditure of funds.84 Where intentional
discriminatory state action has resulted in restricting a predominantly
Black group of tenants to Black sites, as was found in Gautreaux, the
relief must provide for the opportunity to be assigned to White-site
Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, P-H EQUAL OPP. IN HOUSING 13,613 (W.D.N.Y.
June 12, 1978).
83 See, e.g., Blackshear Residents Organization v. Housing Authority, 347 F. Supp. 1188,
1150 (W.D. Tex. 1972); cf. North Avondale Neighborhood Ass'n v. Cincinnati Metropoli-
tan Housing Authority, 464 F.2d 486 (6th Cir. 1972).
84 It is by now clear that neither the state nor the federal government may be forced,
by a private party, to give relief that requires the expenditure of money from the public
fisc. Edelman v. Jordan, 94 S. Ct. 1347 (1974); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949). See also Employees of Dep't of Public Health & Welfare v.
Department of Public Health, 98 S. Ct. 1614 (1973); Land v. Dollar, 30 U.S. 781 (1947). No
language in current enabling legislation appears to waive HUD's sovereign immunity de-
fense, nor does the legislation require, by "clear language," the states' consent to affirma-
tive relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1404a (1970); Employees of Dep't of Public Health & Welfare v.
Department of Public Health, supra. A local government may not raise a sovereign im-
munity defense against an order to make affirmative expenditures, Workman v. City of
New York, 179 U.S. 552 (1900), but fiscal limitations and the potential for concurrent dis-
proportionate injury to citizens who are thereby denied other governmental benefits make
such a remedy unacceptable. Cf. note 8 supra & note 100 infra.
The constitutional violation here considered, however, involves the ongoing expenditure
of money by or under the direction of the municipality, state, or federal government.
The pattern of segregation will be reinforced if money is expended on programs without
remedial action being taken. It is therefore appropriate for the courts to require that any
money that is expended be used in a manner that does not reinforce the constitutional
violation. Where, for example, the court has ordered the municipal defendants to con-
struct new housing as expeditiously as possible, and HUD has committed funds sufficient
for such construction, the court may also order that only White sites be approved by
HUD, an order which requires no increased expenditure of public funds. Once funds
for'a housing allowance program have been allocated, similar conditions may be imposed
on their expenditure-that the funds must be used so as to avoid reinforcing the pattern
of segregation. See generally Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 351 F. Supp. 1279
(D.N.M. 1972); United States v. Texas, 842 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d
518 (5th Cir. 1972). But see Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 94 S. Ct. 786 (1974).
It is also to be noted that in the public housing cases HUD has either waived its
sovereign immunity defense, Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 1971), or
has failed to raise it.
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projects. When there are no such projects in White areas because of
racial discrimination in the site-selection process, it is necessary not
only to prohibit discrimination in future choice of sites, but also to
require the choice of White sites until the opportunity to be assigned
to either a White-area project or a Black-area project exists for all
tenants."5 The detailed Gautreaux judgment order88 was thus concep-
tually justifiable insofar as it required the Chicago Housing Authority
to use its best efforts to provide new housing units as rapidly as
possible,87 with a greater proportion of the new sites placed in non-
minority sections of the city.88
85 Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969), involved only a preliminary in-
junction against a proposed 100-unit project in a Black area which was intended to ac-
commodate only Blacks; there already existed 140 White units and 200 Black units,
segregated by project occupancy and location. In Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority,
304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969), the final order dealt with the entire system of segregated
housing (four White projects and fifty Black projects, see 296 F. Supp. at 910), and re-
quired the construction of a substantial number of White-site projects, with the imple-
mentation of an essentially first-come, first-served tenant assignment plan. 304 F. Supp. at
738-43. Where balancing projects exist in Black and White areas, the equal protection
guarantee is satisfied by an objective tenant assignment system. Cf. Taylor v. City of
Millington, 476 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1973). Although the authorities might attempt to cure
the violation by demolishing existing projects in Black areas, this solution is unlikely to
be accepted by the courts because of the requirement that an equitable remedy must
balance public and private interests. Cf. North Avondale Neighborhood Ass'n v. Cincin-
nati Metropolitan Housing Authority, 464 F.2d 486 (6th Cir. 1972), affirming the denial of
a preliminary injunction that would have required demolition of a nearly completed
minority-area project. Such a remedy, the court points out, would be undesirable in light
of the serious housing shortage in Cincinnati. See also Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.2d
124, 127 (7th Cir. 1972), reversing Judge Austin in his enjoining of Model Cities funds in
an attempt to pressure the City Council to provide new public housing. The Court of
Appeals held that the adverse effect on the interests of thousands of Model Cities Program
beneficiaries outweighed the potential benefit of such a supplementary remedy.
88 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
87 The Chicago Housing Authority has finally announced, nearly five years after the
Gautreaux judgment order, that it will build the new units in White areas of the city.
Chicago Sun Times, May 10, 1974, at 54, col. 2. The district court had previously at-
tempted unsuccessfully to require such construction by setting a timetable for the pro-
posal of acceptable sites, Unpublished Order (N.D. Il. July 20, 1970), aff'd, 436 F.2d 306
(7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971); cutting off HUD Model Cities funds, 332
F. Supp. 366 (N.D. Ill. 1971), rev'd, 457 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1972); and suspending the
Illinois statute that required City Council approval of sites before their acquisition, 342
F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Ill. 1972), aff'd, 480 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 895,
896 (1974).
88 304 F. Supp. at 738-39, 741. The situation is unlike that in Palmer v. Thompson,
403 U.S. 217 (1971), where the Supreme Court held that the closing of all public swim-
ming pools in Jackson, Mississippi, cured the prior denial of equal protection caused by
their segregated operation. In Palmer, the violation was terminated by a complete elimina-
tion of the public facility and no subsequent indirect support of segregated private
facilities. See Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). Where a local housing au-
thority continues to operate existing public housing on unconstitutionally chosen sites
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When the segregation results solely from discriminatory tenant
assignment, the most effective remedy would be to require immediate
reassignment of all public housing units within the locality according
to nonracial criteria. If the number of projects is substantial and the
turnover rate fairly high, however, it may be sufficient to permit the
assignment of units without regard to race as they are vacated in the
natural course.8 9 The most acceptable nonracial criterion is likely to
be a freedom-of-choice plan.90
In some instances, however, prior racial discrimination will have so
aggravated the climate of segregation that a freedom-of-choice plan
will not be sufficient to eliminate strong restrictive influences and to
allow the free exercise by applicants of the choice of living in integrated
housing.91 In such cases, affirmative obligations to counteract those
restrictive influences will remain . 2 Those obligations can be satisfied
by the introduction of programs that will provide sufficient encourage-
ment towards integration to counteract the segregative effects, 93 or by
forced integration until the prior attitudes are eliminated.9 4
C. Meeting the Remedial Standard Under Future Housing Programs
There are strong indications that current federal housing programs
will be modified considerably within the next several years.95 It seems
or to grant subsidies within a segregated system of their own creation, they continue to
violate the constitutional guarantee of freedom from discrimination.
89 See Taylor v. City 9f Millington, 476 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1978). See generally note 85
supra.
90 See note 65 supra.
91 Although the constitutional violation is in the system of discrimination, not in the
segregation it produces, the results of a freedom-of-choice program should be examined
for the information they impart about subtle barriers to nonracial access that remain.
While no longer explicitly coercive, such barriers are a direct result of prior state dis-
crimination. Even allowing for group cohesion, it may still fairly be assumed that some
proportion of Blacks either prefer or do not object to living in integrated housing and
neighborhoods. See Ackerman, Integration for Subsidized Housing and the Question of
Racial Occupancy Controls, 26 STAN. L. Rv. 245, 266-69 (1974). Thus where a newly-ap-
plied freedom-of-choice or two-refusal (see note 65 supra) tenant assignment system pro-
duces no change in racial occupancy patterns, the constitutional violation should be held
not to have been cured, and an objective or no-refusal system should be applied. The
situation will be more difficult, however, if there is no possibility of such objective as-
signment, as under a housing allowance system that allows some of the program bene-
ficiaries to seek housing in the private market. See text and notes at notes 98-107 infra.
92 Cf. Green v. County School Bd., 891 U.S. 430 (1968).
93 See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 304 F. Supp. 786, 739-41 (N.D.
Ill. 1969). The judgment order sets limits on new project size, project concentration, and
project occupancy by site area residents, and requires the compilation of a new waiting
list after intensive publicity as to the availability of White-site public housing.
94 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22-25 (1971).
95 President Nixon's January, 1978, moratorium on new spending in most of HUD's
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likely that Congress ultimately will replace programs providing for
new public housing construction with a system of direct cash subsidies
to qualifying tenants, which may be used as rent payments on the
private market.96
To the extent that a constitutional violation is caused exclusively
by discriminatory tenant assignment and can be remedied by an effec-
tive freedom-of-choice plan or nonracial selection procedure, the shift
to a cash subsidy program will have little effect on the ability of courts
to fashion an appropriate remedial order. Cash subsidies, however,
will not be sufficient to cure the constitutional violation caused by
discriminatory tenant assignment if the past practices of the state have
aggravated the climate of segregation so as to reduce the inclination
of Blacks or Whites to choose integrated housing and limit the avail-
ability of such housing for those who desire it. Similarly, racially dis-
criminatory site selection may effectively increase the stock of accessible
low-income housing in Black areas without a concomitant increase
in White areas, 97 and, except to the extent that private White-area
landlords make low-income units available on a nondiscriminatory
basis, Blacks will be unable to find integrated housing. In both of
these situations the Black housing applicant is denied his right to
nonsegregated housing because of state-imposed racial discrimination.
An appropriate remedy would, therefore, require the state to take
programs was followed by declarations of his intention to shape future housing programs
around direct cash assistance to low-income tenants and use of existing housing stock.
Congress has acted in the direction of Administration proposals. See note 9 supra.
98 The bill passed in the Senate on March 11, 1974, differs from the Administration's
bill in that it sets a limit on spending under the expanded Experimental Housing Allow-
ance Program, refrains from declaring a policy of favoring direct cash assistance as the
general solution to housing needs, refrains from setting a specific restriction on the power
to build new low-income housing without a determination that the private supply is in-
adequate, and provides no termination date for HUD's authority to enter new contracts
for low-income housing assistance. Compare S. 3066, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at ch. II, § 201,
and ch. VIII, § 802 (1974) (the bill ultimately passed by the Senate), with S. 2507, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. at Title I, §§ 102, 104, and Title III, § 301 (1973) (the Administration bill).
The Senate's version, however, increases the authorization for the Experimental Housing
Allowance Program, and enumerates a comprehensive list of specific issues it is to address.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1701z-3 (1970). The housing allowance variables currently under study are
1) payment formula, 2) conditions imposed on use of the allowance, 3) nonmonetary sup-
plementary assistance to recipients, 4) administrative mechanism, and 5) coverage and
scale of the program. 1 HUD, ANN. REP. oF EXPEnMENTAL HousIno ALLOwANCE PROoRAM
1 (1973).
See generally HUD, HousING IN TMi SvxNTss (1973) (the report of the housing study);
Peabody, Housing Allowances, Tm NEw REPuriac, March 9, 1974, at 20.
97 Under the housing allowance program, the court will be able to order new construc-
tion neither by the local authority, because of a lack of fiscal capability, nor by HUD, be-
cause of its sovereign immunity defense, see note 84 supra.
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action to increase the existing amount of integrated low-income hous-
ing. Such action not only would enlarge the supply of housing available
to Blacks who would prefer not to live in segregated dwellings, but
also would effectively serve to moderate the climate of segregation
imposed by the state. Since under the cash assistance program HUD
cannot be forced to finance new housing,98 the increase in the stock
of integrated housing units must be created by the removal of racial
restrictions from private housing and by active encouragement of
integration, at least until all indirect barriers are eliminated. The
actions necessary to this remedy will almost certainly affect adversely
the rights of persons who were not parties to the lawsuit. Courts have
recognized, however, that an adverse effect on persons who may have
no connection with the constitutional violation is at times an un.
avoidable hardship of ending racial discrimination."9 Unnecessarily
broad interference with the rights of third parties will, however, be
reversed as an abuse of the court's discretion.10 0 It is within this frame-
work that courts must fashion remedies that utilize the direct cash
assistance program.
The courts have available to them four general remedial schemes
that will increase the existence of integrated housing in the private
market. These schemes will be discussed in order of their effectiveness.
As the remedies become more effective, however, they also create a
greater adverse impact on the rights of third parties.
1. Nonmonetary Affirmative Assistance. The first remedy involves
nonmonetary affirmative assistance for Black recipients. This assistance
may include education and information services about the housing
market, the accompanying of recipients on their trips to inquire about
housing openings, aid in the following up of initial inquiries, and
stricter and more vigorous enforcement of federal and local fair housing
laws.101
98 The re-creation of a construction-financing program would constitute "affirmative ac-
tion" such as cannot be ordered if the sovereign immunity defense is raised. See Larson
v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949); note 84 supra. If all housing
programs were terminated, sovereign immunity might bar all types of relief from the fed-
eral and state governments. It is extremely unlikely, however, that all housing programs
will be discontinued.
99 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971); Norwalk CORE
v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 951-32 (2d Cir. 1968).
. 100 See Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.2d 124, 128-29 (7th Cir. 1972), holding that an in-
junction against release of HUD funds in a nonhousing-related program was an abuse of
discretion, on the ground that parties adversely affected by the fund cut-off were innocent
third parties, or even members of the plaintiff dass'itself.
101 Different types of nonmonetary assistance are being tried as part of the Experimental
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Although such affirmative assistance may involve differential treat-
ment that disadvantages housing allowance recipients to whom it is
not available, the burden on innocent parties is relatively light. The
assistance is tailored to the specific end of helping Black recipients who
desire to live in White areas overcome discriminatory barriers. The
unavailability of such assistance to White recipients or to Black recip-
ients who choose to live in Black areas is not a significant disadvantage
since it would be superfluous to their full and effective use of their
housing allowances. The usefulness of this remedial scheme is, however,
limited. Where there are long-standing patterns of segregation, the
program is not likely to encourage many Blacks to seek housing in
White areas, and it will do nothing to induce Whites to integrate
predominantly Black housing. This remedy would seem, therefore, to
be effective only where there is both ample housing in White areas
to accommodate a substantial number of Black residents and minimal
community opposition to integration.
2. Bonus Payments. In most instances a more effective remedy will
be required. One such remedy involves a system of favored treatment
in the payment formula. For example, a bonus might be granted Black
recipients who spend their subsidy outside an area of minority con-
centration. This bonus would tend to overcome the Black recipient's
hesitation to settle in areas from which he has always been excluded
in the segregated public housing system. A concomitant effect may be
the settling of Whites in Black areas. If the housing allowance to Blacks
seeking to settle in White areas is higher than that for Whites seeking
to settle in the same areas, then Blacks could outbid Whites for the
available housing, forcing Whites to accept housing elsewhere, some
presumably in Black neighborhoods. A similar bonus could, of course,
be offered to Whites who settle in Black areas. Such a bonus, however,
would lack the compensatory justification that has been articulated as
a reason for giving bonuses to Blacks, 10 2 but if the size of the bonus
is sufficient to overcome the substantial hesitancy of Whites to move
Housing Allowance Program. HUD, ANN. REP. OF EXPERIMENTAL HOUSING ALLOWANCE
PROGRAM, supra note 96, at 10. No results, however, have as yet been reported.
Cf. Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 357 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (judgment or-
der), where the court required relocation assistance to Black displacees of a moderate-
income urban renewal area. The assistance included acquisition for rental to displacees
of the homes of some of the persons who applied to move into the new project, the re-
writing and strict enforcement of the local fair housing law, provision of personal escorts
for displacees in their inquiries in the open housing market, attempts to persuade private
owners thus contacted to sell or rent on a nondiscriminatory basis, and the payment of
some moving expenses. Id. at 928, 932-33.
102 See text at notes 98-99 supra.
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into ghetto areas, the plan would result in increasing the stock of
integrated housing in formerly all-Black as well as formerly all-White
areas.
The adverse impact of this remedy on the rights of third parties is
substantial. The bonus for Blacks settling in White areas constitutes
favored treatment of certain Blacks over Whites and over those Blacks
who choose to maintain residence in minority areas. The disfavored
class, however, consists mainly of those who were not injured by the
original violative government restriction, 08 and no party is totally
denied the benefit of the housing allowance program.
3. Access Quotas. A stronger measure, involving a variation of the
conditions imposed on the use of the allowance, is an "access quota,"'0 4
which would require that a certain number of Black recipients must
have obtained residence in nonminority areas before any more allow-
ances may be given to Whites for use in that area. Under this remedy,
the defendant agency has the burden of identifying and encouraging
minority recipients who are willing to settle in nonminority areas.
The remedy also increases the differential between what Black recip-
ients and White recipients can bid for housing in White areas. The
access quota in its harshest form temporarily prevents Whites from
obtaining housing in certain areas, but this may not outweigh the
necessity for such a remedy when long-standing discrimination in site
selection and tenant assignment has resulted in a great hesitancy on the
part of Blacks to seek integrated housing and a tight supply of low-
income housing in white areas.
4. Integration or Dispersion Quotas. An "integration quota"'u0 places
a ceiling on the number of Blacks who can use their allowance to settle
in Black-areas. 10 6 This type of quota would require a substantial num-
ber of Blacks to settle in White or integrated areas if they are to be
able to use their housing allowances. Coupling an integration quota
103 This is unlike the fund cut-off remedy in Gautreaux. See note 100 supra.
104 See Ackerman, supra note 91, at 247.
105 Id. The logic of the integration quota, to prevent resegregation in initially White
areas, is based upon the notion of a tipping point, and minority concentration beyond
that point makes the area Black for purposes of the operation of the quota. In the
initially Black area, the integration quota operates to disperse minority recipients.
106 An alternative formulation of this integration quota is the tentative suggestion
made by one HUD official that a condition of minority concentration in any neighborhood
would place housing in that neighborhood below a level of "standard housing" that
might be required for use of the allowance. This seems essentially a resurrection of the
FHA's "red-line" procedure. Interview with Nancy Chisholm, Policymaker, Division of
Policy Development, Office of Equal Opportunity, HUD, in Washington, D.C., November
12, 1973. Whatever the propriety of such a system when voluntarily undertaken, its evalu-
ation as a remedy is subject to the same analysis as a pure integration quota.
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with an access quota will result in an even greater quantity of inte-
grated housing.
The interplay of access and integration quotas would permit the
use of housing allowances only in truly integrated housing. There
seems to be little justification, however, for forcing Blacks to integrate
under threat of such a severe penalty.1 7 The constitutional violation
consisted of a denial of true freedom of choice, not the absence of
integrated housing. In addition, the inequities of impairing the rights
of Whites through the imposition of access quotas are compounded by
restricting the freedom of Blacks to choose where they would like to
live. It seems anomalous to affect adversely the rights of those same
parties who have been most injured by the past discrimination and
who are the intended beneficiaries of the remedy.
CONCLUSION
Open discrimination in site selection and tenant assignment has
largely been abandoned, and the covert practices that remain are sub-
stantially more difficult to prove. Although proof of covert discrimina-
tion must be indirect, with a necessarily tenuous link of culpability in
a moral sense, a finding of such discrimination is appropriate where
statistical evidence plus evidence as to the current and historical opera-
tion of explicit policies strongly indicates the systematic use of the
criterion of race.
Courts that have found such discrimination have been working to
construct appropriate remedies under the current housing programs,
but the problem of remedies will be made more complex by the replace-
ment of federal construction-financing programs with federal cash
allowance programs. It will be possible, however, for a court to struc-
ture the cash assistance program so that the use of bonuses, access
quotas, and integration quotas effectively eliminates state-maintained
denials of the rights of minorities to obtain housing without restriction
on account of their race.
John I. Stewart, Jr.
107 See text at notes 77-81 supra. There has been some suggestion that the exdusory
effects of such a quota voluntarily undertaken in furtherance of a statutory policy of
promoting integration can be justified in the interest of preventing resegregation. See
Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973); ef. Ackerman,
supra note 91.
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